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Are Dispositions Causally Relevant? 
Jennifer McKitrick  
University of Nebraska–Lincoln 
Abstract: To determine whether dispositions are causally relevant, we have to 
get clear about what causal relevance is. Several characteristics of causal rele-
vance have been suggested, including Explanatory Power, Counterfactual De-
pendence, Lawfulness, Exclusion, Independence, and Minimal Sufficiency. 
Different accounts will yield different answers about the causal relevance of 
dispositions. However, accounts of causal relevance that are the most plausi-
ble, for independent reasons, render the verdict that dispositions are causally 
relevant.  
Are dispositions causally relevant to their manifestations? According to some 
philosophers, dispositions are inert, impotent, causally irrelevant, and ineffi-
cacious (Block 1990; Kim 1988; Prior et al. 1982). Presumably, other properties 
do not suffer these inadequacies, but have some relation to events that dispo-
sitions lack. Why would anyone think such a thing? The following arguments 
are typical: 
The Analyticity Argument (Block 1990; Dardis 1993; Jackson 1995): 
1. “Being fragile” means being prone to break. 
2. Therefore, fragility is non-contingently connected to breaking. 
3 A cause is only contingently connected to its effect. 
4. Therefore, fragility is not causally relevant to breaking. 
The Exclusion Argument (Kim 1990; Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson 1982): 
1. The crystalline structure of the glass and the striking (plus back-
ground circumstances) constitute a complete causal explanation of the 
breaking. 
2. Therefore, there is no causal/explanatory work for the glass’s fragility 
to do. 
3. Therefore, fragility is not causally relevant to breaking. 
One may find fault with these arguments on a number of grounds. How-
ever, in this paper I want to explore the implicit assumptions these argu-
ments make about the nature of causal relevance. What conditions or con-
straints should we use in deciding whether a property is causally relevant? I 
will consider several candidate conditions on causal relevance and consider 
358       J .  M c K i t r i c K  i n  S y n t h e S e  144  (2005)
what they mean for dispositions. The upshot is that the most plausible ac-
counts of causal relevance will count dispositions as causally relevant. 
Causal relevance is one thread in a web of interrelated concepts, which in-
cludes causation, events, properties, laws of nature, necessity, and possibil-
ity. I am not going to tease all of these concepts apart, or justify all of my as-
sumptions. I am assuming that causation is a relation between events, which 
I think of as space-time regions and their contents. Beyond that, I do not take 
myself to be assuming or offering any particular account of causation. Many 
conditions of causal relevance appeal to laws of nature, and again, no particu-
lar account of laws is assumed. 
What do I mean by “causal relevance”? Examples convey the intuitive 
idea. Johnny throws a baseball and it shatters a windowpane. Even if we as-
sume that the throwing event caused the breaking event, there is a further 
question we may consider. Which properties of the cause are relevant to the 
effect? The mass and the velocity of the ball seem like prime candidates for 
being relevant to the window breaking. However, the color of the ball is un-
likely to be relevant. 
In the first instance causal relevance is a relation between a property and 
an effect. So, we want an account of statements of the form: “Property F is 
causally relevant to event e.” F is a property of the cause of e or of some part 
of the cause. I move freely between talk of properties of the event, and prop-
erties of part of the event as candidate causally relevant properties. If you 
prefer to restrict causal relevance to properties of events, you can think of an 
object’s property F in terms of an event’s property of involving an F object 
(Braun 1995). 
“Causal relevance” is something of a philosophical term of art with no 
standard usage. Some philosophers take it to relate different relata—a prop-
erty and a property, an event and an event, various combinations of prop-
erties and events. Philosophers also employ different terminology: “caus-
ally potent,” “causally responsible,” “explanatorily relevant,” “causally 
efficacious,” etc. Some philosophers make subtle distinctions between these 
terms (Block 1995; Fodor 1989; Hitchcock 1993; Jackson 1995; Jackson and 
Pettit 1990; Lepore and Loewer 1987; MacDonald and MacDonald 1995; Se-
gal and Sober 1991). Perhaps we need to distinguish different relations that 
properties of causes can have to effects. Nevertheless, people have intu-
itions about what is and is not causally relevant, and they talk as if they dis-
agree about whether dispositions are causally relevant (Jackson and Pettit 
1990; Segal and Sober 1991). It seems as though there is some root notion 
people are concerned about, and this is more than a mere verbal dispute. 
One way to break through the jargon and get to the crux of the issue is to 
ask: What relation is supposed to hold between the mass of the ball and the 
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window breaking, but not the color of the ball and the window breaking? 
Does this same relation hold between the fragility of the glass, and the win-
dow breaking? 
I assume the following basic minimal necessary condition on causal rele-
vance: for a property to be causally relevant to an event, it must be a property 
of the cause of that event. 
If F is causally relevant to e, 
then there is some event c such that c causes e, and c has F. 
Of course, this condition is not sufficient. It does not distinguish between 
mass of ball and color of ball. Further conditions need to be added to get a 
complete account. We want to screen off the causally irrelevant properties. 
That is what these further conditions purport to do. I suppose all of them are 
intended to be necessary conditions, and some set of them, plus the minimal 
necessary condition above, would ideally make for necessary and sufficient 
conditions. Failures of sufficiency do not show that the condition should be 
rejected, but perhaps augmented with further conditions. If a condition is un-
necessary, that is prima facie reason to reject it. I argue that the conditions 
that screen off dispositions are unnecessary. 
1. Explanatory Conditions (Dretske 1988; Kim 1988) 
A causally relevant property has some explanatory power. If F is caus-
ally relevant to e, then F explains e. Well, what does that mean? Perhaps F is 
apt for being mentioned in a causal explanation of why e occurred. In other 
words, F is part of a satisfying answer to the question “why did e occur?.” 
Call this the Weak Explanatory Condition. 
Notice that dispositions are apt for being mentioned in explanations of 
their manifestations. Why did the glass break? It was fragile. Moliere not 
withstanding, that would be a satisfying explanation in many contexts (Mo-
liere 1935). Why did I get a shock? Because I was touching something that 
was electrically conductive. Why is she so quiet? She’s shy. 
But we can concoct stories in which apparently irrelevant properties are 
mentioned in explanations which satisfy their audiences. Suppose Johnny has 
a white baseball and a yellow foam-rubber ball. Jane asks “why did the win-
dow break?” and she receives the answer “because Johnny threw the white 
ball.” Jane has the relevant background information, and so this explanation 
satisfies her. But we were supposing that the color of the ball was not relevant 
to the window breaking.1 
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We can concoct stories like this, because various pragmatic considerations 
determine whether an answer to a why question is satisfactory. What back-
ground knowledge does the audience have? What are their interests? Propo-
nents of explanatory conditions want to by-pass these epistemic, pragmatic 
considerations. Perhaps we could say that if F is causally relevant to e, then F 
would be mentioned in an ideal explanation of why e occurred. Alternatively, 
there is no complete, true explanation of e that fails to mention F. Call this the 
Strong Explanatory Condition. If complete, true, ideal explanations of events 
do not mention dispositions, this view would have the consequence that dis-
positions are not causally relevant. 
However, I am skeptical of the idea of an audience-independent “ideal ex-
planation.” Different explanations have different degrees of complexity and 
detail, and operate at different “levels.” There can be a true, complete expla-
nation of an event that does not mention a causally relevant property, be-
cause the explanation operates at a level of description at which mentioning 
the property is not appropriate or salient. 
Some people think that explanatory relations are out there in the world. A 
property can explain some event even if no one knows about it. But even the 
realist about explanation does not hold that explanatory facts are brute facts. 
If F explains e, that must be in virtue of some other relation that F and e have. 
Maybe F explains e because F is causally relevant to e. So, this condition on 
causal relevance seems to put the cart before the horse. 
2. The Counterfactual Dependence Condition (Horgan 1989; Lepore 
and Loewer 1987, 1989; Ruben 1994) 
One might say that the important difference between the velocity of the 
ball and its color, vis-a-vis the breaking, is the following: If the throw had not 
been so fast, then the window would not have broken; however, even if the 
ball had not been white, the window would have broken just the same. The 
effect depends on the instantiation of the causally relevant property. That is 
to say: 
If F is causally relevant to e, 
then if c did not have F, then e would not have occurred. 
Notice dispositions pass this test. If the glass were not fragile, it would not 
have broken. 
Admittedly, this account has some difficulties. One oft noted problem is 
over-determination or pre-emption. Maybe the glass would have broken due 
to some other cause. Suppose there was another baseball heading for the win-
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dow. Then, even if the throw were not fast enough, the window still would 
have broken. As we shall see, over-determination will cause problems for 
other accounts of causal relevance. I think the Counterfactual Dependence 
Condition can get around over-determination by other events by making the 
following alteration. 
If F is causally relevant to e, 
then if c did not have F, then c would not have caused e. 
If the throw had not been so fast, then it would not have broken the glass. 
This would be true even if something else would have broken the glass in-
stead. Again, dispositions pass this test. If the wire had not been conductive, 
then touching the wire would not have caused a shock.2 
The Counterfactual Dependence Condition still has a problem with over-
determining properties. Suppose I notice a bright flashing light. My noticing 
it is over-determined by the brightness and the flashing. It seems that both 
the brightness and the flashing are causally relevant to my noticing the light. 
However, the associated counterfactuals are false. The account tells us that, 
since the brightness is causally relevant, if the light were not bright, the bright 
flashing light would not have gotten my attention, but that is false. 
Granted, there are unsolved problems for this account. As others have dis-
cussed, the Counterfactual Dependence Condition has trouble with closely 
related properties (traveling 60 mph and traveling 59 mph) and co-exten-
sive properties (electrical conductivity and thermal conductivity) (Block 1990; 
Braun 1995). Nevertheless, there is something to the idea that effects are coun-
terfactually dependent on the causally relevant properties of their causes. 
And while philosophers tend to turn to counterfactual dependence as a test of 
causal relevance, they less frequently observe that dispositions pass this test 
(Allen 1995; Heil and Mele 1991). 
3. The Increased Probability Condition 
Drawing on probabilistic accounts of causation (Hitchcock 1993), it oc-
curred to me that we could analyze causal relevance in the following way. If 
a property is causally relevant it increases the probability of the effect. 
If F is causally relevant to e, then P (e/cF) > P  (e/c ~ F). 
The probability of the window breaking when the trajectory of the throw is 
towards the window is greater than the probability of the window breaking 
when the trajectory of the throw is not towards the window. 
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Dispositions meet this condition. The probability that the window will 
break is greater if the glass is fragile. Furthermore, this condition has the ad-
vantage of capturing the intuitive idea that dispositions are tendencies which 
make certain outcomes more likely, rather than guaranteeing them. 
Like the Counterfactual Dependence Condition, the Increased Probabil-
ity Condition will still have some problems with co-extensive and closely re-
lated properties. The problem with closely related properties takes the fol-
lowing form. The ball’s traveling 40 mph is causally relevant to the window 
breaking. But suppose that the window would have been more likely to break 
if the ball had been traveling 50 mph. Now, P  (breaking/traveling 40 mph) 
< P  (breaking/traveling 50 mph). Since traveling 50 mph is one way of not 
traveling 40 mph, traveling 40 mph is not causally relevant, by the Increased 
Probability Condition. The condition is going to say that a property F is not 
causally relevant to e whenever there is a closely related property that would 
increase the probability of e to a greater extent than F does. What seems to be 
causing the trouble is that we need some way to determine what would fol-
low if the cause differed by one property. What is c like when c does not have 
F? In some cases, you cannot just subtract F from c; c will have some other 
property instead. 
Perhaps the details of this account could be worked out to overcome these 
problems. Despite these problems, the Increase Probability Condition could 
be part of a promising account that will allow causally relevant dispositions. 
4. The Independence Condition (Dardis 1993; Horgan 1989; Lepore 
and Loewer 1989; Ludwig 1998) 
Besides weighing one pound, and traveling 70 mph, Johnny’s ball had 
another property. In retrospect, we can now say that it was a “window-
breaker.” Something is a window-breaker at every point of its existence if, at 
any point of its existence, it breaks a window. Now, the mass and the veloc-
ity of the ball were relevant to the window breaking. What about being a win-
dow-breaker? Could it be causally relevant to the window breaking? The In-
dependence Condition says “no.” According to the Independence Condition, 
if F is causally relevant to e, there is no non-causal dependence between F and 
e. The F is not “committed” to causing e. In other words: 
If F is causally relevant to e, 
then there is a possible world in which c has F, but c does not cause e, 
& there is a possible world in which c causes e, but c does not have F. 
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In every possible world in which Johnny’s throw causes the window to break, 
Johnny throws a “window-breaker.” So, being a window-breaker is not caus-
ally relevant to the window breaking. 
Arguably, dispositions do not satisfy the Independence Condition. As 
mentioned, there is a conceptual dependence between the concept of a dis-
position and the concept of its manifestation. There is no possible world in 
which an attack is lethal, but does not kill. There is no possible world in which 
an attack kills, but is not lethal. So, being lethal is not independent of death, 
and so does not meet the Independence Condition. However, some disposi-
tions might satisfy this condition if they are probilifying rather than sure-fire. 
Sometimes fragile things do not break when struck, and sometimes non-frag-
ile things break when struck. 
While some applications of the Independence Condition seem plausible, 
other consequences are counterintuitive. For example, sunburn is concep-
tually dependent on sunlight; there is no possible world in which an event 
causes sunburn, but that event is not an exposure to sunlight. Proponents of 
the Independence Condition claim that exposure to sunlight is not causally 
relevant to sunburn (Dardis 1993). More importantly, the Independence Con-
dition rests on deep metaphysical assumptions about contingency of causal 
connections. On this view, any causal generalization “F-events cause G-
events” might have been false. This view is very contentious and is unlikely 
to be accepted without argument (Ellis 2001; Shoemaker 1980; Stalnaker 
1987). 
A further problem with this condition is that it seems to confuse seman-
tics and metaphysics. We should distinguish relations between things in the 
world, and relations between our concepts. Finding a relation between our 
concepts does not preclude finding an interesting relation between the en-
tities that fall under those concepts. As Davidson says, if c causes e we can 
dub c “the cause of e.” We could then formulate the apparent conceptual 
truth “the cause of e causes e.” However, this should not tempt us to think 
that the cause of e does not cause e (1980). Analogously, suppose that F is 
causally relevant to e. Now dub F “a property which is causally relevant to 
e.” We can now say “a property which is causally relevant to e is causally 
relevant to e,” but we should not therefore think that F is not causally rele-
vant to e. 
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5. The Pattern Condition (Fodor 1989; MacDonald and MacDonald 
1995; McLaughlin 2002; Segal and Sober 1991) 
Various conditions on causal relevance appeal to the natural laws. The 
most straightforward way in which laws figure in causal relevance is cap-
tured in the Pattern Condition, according to which a causally relevant prop-
erty is part of a lawful pattern. The complete account looks like this: 
If F is causally relevant to e, then 
there is some c that causes e, 
c is an F & e is a G 
& it is a law that Fs cause Gs. 
Not knowing enough physics, I do not know how to apply this condition to 
the example of Johnny breaking the window. Perhaps, in making a causal 
relevance claim, I am assuming that the property I mention figures in some 
causal law, even if I do not know what that law is. However, while I think be-
ing a fastball was relevant to the window breaking, I do not think that “being a 
fastball” is likely to figure in any causal law. The Pattern Condition suggests 
that, if F is a causally relevant property, the predicate “F” would be men-
tioned in an ideal articulation of the laws. However, the causal laws might 
turn out to be very specific, and mention only a few fundamental properties, 
not the things we talk about every day. 
Do dispositions figure into causal laws? Probably, but it depends what the 
causal laws turn out to be. In any case, there is reason to be hesitant about ac-
cepting the Pattern Condition. Being a punch in the nose might not be men-
tioned in a causal law, but it seems causally relevant to the nosebleed. The 
Pattern Condition would imply that most of our causal relevance claims are 
false. If they are, so be it. However, it would be preferable to have an account 
of causal relevance that can make more sense of our causal explanations. We 
should look for a condition that is less restrictive. 
6. The Relaxed Pattern Condition (MacDonald And MacDonald 
1995) 
A natural move is to somehow relax the pattern condition. We want the 
causally relevant property to be law-governed, but we do not want to de-
mand that the laws explicitly mention that property. Perhaps we can capture 
this idea as follows. 
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If F is causally relevant to e, then 
there is some c that causes e, 
c is an F and an H & e is a G 
& it is a law that Hs cause Gs. 
Since the causal sequence (c causes e) is governed by a law (Hs cause Gs) and 
c since is an instance of both F and H, F is causally relevant to e. Some philos-
ophers use this condition to try to show that mental properties are causally 
relevant because their instances are also instances of physical, nomological 
properties (Ehring 1999; MacDonald and MacDonald 1995). 
Dispositions will count as causally relevant, on this view. Suppose there 
is some law such that certain molecular bonds break when subject to forces 
of a certain magnitude. That type of molecular bonding and fragility are both 
instantiated by the windowpane. So, the fragility is causally relevant to the 
breaking. More to the point, any time a disposition is instantiated by a cause, 
the disposition will count as causally relevant to the effect. 
However, this account does not screen off any properties of the cause. As 
long as causation is law-governed, any property of the cause will count as 
causally relevant. Both the color of the baseball and the mass are jointly in-
stanced, and the mass figures into causal laws. But this gives me no inclina-
tion to think the color is causally relevant. So, the Relaxed Pattern Condition 
is too relaxed. However, there might still be a way to use laws to formulate a 
plausible condition on causal relevance. 
7. The Sufficiency Condition 
When all of the causally relevant properties are instantiated, the laws en-
sure that the effect will occur. So, the set of causally relevant properties is a 
set of properties that is sufficient for the effect. This condition is also too per-
missive, but I introduce it by way of building up to a more plausible account. 
To put it more formally: 
If F is causally relevant to e, then 
F is a member of a set of c’s properties which is sufficient for e, given 
the laws. 
F does not have to be actually mentioned in the laws. However F, and other 
properties in S, plus the laws, guarantee that e will occur. The pitcher throw-
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ing a fastball, together with the mass of the ball, the trajectory of its travel, 
etc., plus the laws, are sufficient for the breaking of the window, even though 
being a fastball is not likely to figure in the laws. 
Dispositions will count as causally relevant on this view. The fragility of 
the window could be part of a set of properties that was sufficient for the 
window breaking. The obvious problem with this view is that you could get 
a sufficient set of properties by throwing in all of the properties of the cause. 
A set of properties that included the color of the ball, in addition to the mass, 
velocity, etc., could be sufficient for e. So, this account is also too permissive. 
However, it motivates the following two conditions. 
8. The Exclusion Condition (Kim 1989; Prior et al. 1982; Segal and 
Sober 1991) 
In deciding which properties are causally relevant, we want to exclude 
properties that are superfluous. A property would not be necessary for the ef-
fect if it were not part of a set of properties that was sufficient for the effect. 
If F is causally relevant to e, then 
there is no set of c’s properties which is sufficient for e, given the laws, 
that does not include F. 
F is a member of every sufficient set. If there is a sufficient set that does not 
include F, then F is not causally relevant. 
This condition might screen off dispositions. If dispositions are higher-or-
der properties, then the causal basis of the disposition, plus the conditions, 
would make for a sufficient set, without the disposition. The Exclusion Con-
dition rules out the possibility that the disposition and the causal basis are 
both causally relevant, and this is thought to be a good thing, because other-
wise, the breaking would be over-determined by the window’s properties. If 
we did not apply the Exclusion Condition, every time a disposition was man-
ifest, the effect would be over-determined, and that seems odd (Block 1990). 
Proponents of Exclusion claim that there cannot be two independent com-
plete causes for one event, except in cases of over-determination, and over-
determination is very rare. 
However, the Exclusion Condition formulated above rules out any possi-
bility of over-determining causally relevant properties, and in this respect it 
goes too far. Recall my noticing the bright flashing light. Since there is a suffi-
cient set of properties that does not include the flashing, the flashing is irrele-
vant, and since there is a sufficient set of properties that does not include the 
A r e  D i s p o s i t i o n s  c A u s A l l y  r e l e v A n t ?        367
brightness, the brightness is irrelevant. Proponents of the Exclusion Condi-
tion have to say over-determination by properties is impossible, or they have 
to allow for exceptions to the condition. The latter amounts to an admission 
that the Exclusion Condition is not necessary for causal relevance. 
If the Exclusion Condition is not necessary for causal relevance, it is not 
at all clear when we should expect it to be satisfied. Over-determination by 
properties, or something very much like it, is much more common than pro-
ponents of Exclusion propose. Adapting an example from Stephen Yablo, 
suppose that a baseball going 70 mph is causally relevant to the window 
breaking – it is a member of set of properties sufficient for breaking (1992). 
This set is sufficient even if it does not include going over 50 mph. Neverthe-
less, it seems that the baseball’s going over 50 mph could also be causally rel-
evant to the glass breaking. 
Certain properties of causes have close logical or nomological relations 
with one another: mathematical properties, determinables and determinates, 
supervenient properties and realizers, for example. The Exclusion Condition 
holds that members of one special privileged set of properties of the cause are 
relevant to the effect, and all other properties are irrelevant. We need a way to 
decide which properties of the cause are in the special set. Perhaps the most 
specific, or the most fundamental properties are the causally relevant ones.3 
Like the Pattern Condition, this view would have the consequence that most 
of the causal relevance claims we make are false. So, the Exclusion Condition 
may screen off dispositions, but it will screen off most other properties too. 
9. The Minimal Sufficiency Condition (Fodor 1989) 
Fortunately, there is another way to restrict the Sufficiency Condition. To 
screen off superfluous properties, we insist that the sufficient set be as small 
as it can be, while still being sufficient. More formally, 
If F is causally relevant to e, then 
F is a member of a set S of c’s properties which is sufficient for e, given 
the laws & no proper subset of S is sufficient for e, given the laws. 
Minimal Sufficiency will render the same verdict as Exclusion in many cases. 
Suppose properties P and Q are sufficient for e. What about property R? Ex-
clusion will say that there is a sufficient set that does not include R, so R is not 
causally relevant. Minimal Sufficiency will say, since {P, Q, R} has a proper 
subset that is sufficient for e, inclusion in {P, Q, R} does not show causal 
relevance. 
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However, there are important cases where Exclusion and Minimal Suffi-
ciency will disagree. The conditions will disagree about the causal relevance 
of certain properties when there are distinct sets of properties that are each 
sufficient for an effect. Suppose {P, Q} and {Q, R} are each sufficient for e. Ex-
clusion will have to say we have one of those rare cases of over-determina-
tion, or that either P or R must be irrelevant, since there is a sufficient set that 
does not include it. Minimal Sufficiency would say, unless either P, Q, or R 
is sufficient for e by itself, all are causally relevant, for each are members of 
minimally sufficient sets. 
Minimal Sufficiency can account for over-determining causally relevant 
properties. The brightness of the light would be a member of a set of proper-
ties that was sufficient for attracting my attention, and the flashing would be 
a member of a different sufficient set. As long as they are members of mini-
mally sufficient sets, they are both causally relevant. Furthermore, there is no 
privileged minimally sufficient set. The ball’s going 70 mph would be a mem-
ber of a set of properties that is sufficient for the window breaking, and going 
over 50 mph would be a member of a different minimally sufficient set. Both 
going 70 mph and going over 50 mph can be causally relevant. Minimal Suf-
ficiency screens out irrelevant properties. A set of properties that includes the 
whiteness of the ball will always have a proper subset that is sufficient for the 
breaking. Yet Minimal Sufficiency can accommodate closely related proper-
ties that have equal claims on causal relevance. 
The Minimal Sufficiency Condition will allow for causally relevant dis-
positions. There may be a set of properties that is sufficient for the window 
breaking that includes the molecular structure of the glass, and excludes fra-
gility. However, there may be another sufficient set that includes fragility and 
excludes that particular molecular structure. Both the fragility and the molec-
ular structure will count as causally relevant, on this view. 
10. Conclusion 
Let us reconsider the arguments with which we began. The Analyticity 
Argument assumes that a causally relevant property must satisfy the Inde-
pendence Condition. The dependence between fragility and breaking was 
grounds for saying that fragility is not causally relevant to breaking. The 
Exclusion Argument assumes that causally relevant properties must satisfy 
the Strong Explanatory Condition, and the Exclusion Condition. Since there 
is a complete explanation and a sufficient set of properties that do not in-
clude fragility, fragility is deemed irrelevant. However, we have seen that 
these three conditions on causal relevance are objectionable for indepen-
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dent reasons. There are other accounts of causal relevance available. Some 
of them are quite attractive, and most of them allow that dispositions are 
causally relevant. 
We considered several conditions on causal relevance: Weak and Strong 
Explanatory, Counterfactual Dependence, Increased Probability, Indepen-
dence, Pattern, Relaxed Pattern, Sufficiency, Exclusion, and Minimal Suf-
ficiency. Of these, the Independence, Pattern, Strong Explanatory and Ex-
clusion conditions were the most likely to imply that dispositions are not 
causally relevant to their manifestations. However, we saw that these con-
ditions on causal relevance are very stringent and rule out not only dispo-
sitions, but also other properties that intuitively seem causally relevant. All 
of the other conditions on causal relevance we have considered are compati-
ble with the causal relevance of dispositions. Some of these conditions (Weak 
Explanatory, Relaxed Pattern, and Sufficiency) are too permissive; without 
added conditions, they would count apparently irrelevant properties as caus-
ally relevant. However, the Counterfactual Dependence, Increased Probabil-
ity, and Minimal Sufficiency conditions offer promising, disposition-friendly 
approaches to analyzing causal relevance. 
Admittedly, each condition has some outstanding problems and details 
need to be worked out to develop a full account of causal relevance. Dispo-
sition-friendly accounts are certainly in no worse a position than disposition-
unfriendly accounts, and I think they are actually in a better position for the 
following reason. Disposition-friendly conditions face a few counterexamples 
where they seem to render the wrong verdict regarding the causal relevance 
of certain properties. One hopes that, with refinement, we will reach some 
reconciliation between our favorite account and our intuitions about certain 
cases. However, the problems with the disposition-unfriendly accounts will 
not disappear with refinement. The Exclusion Condition cannot account for 
over-determining properties, or different sets of properties with equal claims 
to causal relevance, for it is central to Exclusion that such things must be 
ruled out. Tinkering with the Independence Condition will not result in an 
account that will allow that sunlight is causally relevant to sunburn, or allow 
that any property is necessarily causally relevant to some effect, for Indepen-
dence is designed to screen off such properties. 
The situation with the Pattern Condition is somewhat different. With re-
finement it can overcome certain problems and counter-examples. However, I 
suggest that refining the Pattern Condition moves us in the direction of a dis-
position-friendly account, such as Minimal Sufficiency. 
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Notes 
1. John Gibbons offers a more familiar example: The whiteness of a pool ball can figure 
into explanations, particularly on a “per pay” pool table, where the white ball is the 
only one that automatically comes out after it is sunk (Gibbons 2001). Yet here again, the 
whiteness seems causally irrelevant. 
2. Braun presents a counter-example to this variant analysis: “Betty listens to Wilma to de-
termine whether Wilma is singing at the right pitch to shatter the glass. Betty has de-
cided to sing if Wilma’s pitch is not correct. So if Wilma’s singing had not had that pitch, 
it would still cause the glass to shatter, by first causing Betty to sing” (Braun 1995). The 
pitch is causally relevant, but the counterfactual is false. 
3. Kim (1991) claims something along these lines. 
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